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Response to my Commentator
ROBERT C. PINTO
Centre for Research on Reasoning, Argument and Rhetoric
University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario
Canada
pinto@uwindsor.ca

In his thoughtful comments Scott reads me as holding an “ecumenical epistemic
theory of argument” on two fronts.
First, from the fact that I formulate the issues that arise in epistemic
approaches to argument in terms of the concept “reasonable” rather than in terms of
“epistemic justification” he concludes I hold that
the contentious issue of the nature of epistemic justification needn’t be inherited by
[my] epistemic theory of argument.

Such a reading of my view is, I think, misleading. Much of what I’ve written in the
last 7 years has been devoted to spelling out in detail when and why it is reasonable
to adopt one or another cognitive attitude toward a propositional content – a task
that is quite analogous to that of addressing “the contentious issue of the nature of
epistemic justification.” For example, Pinto (2006) attempts to develop a detailed
account of argument evaluation and of the warrants to which such evaluation must
revert: it defends a qualitative version of evidence proportionism that does not does
not to my knowledge repeat anything else that has appeared in the epistemological
literature to date. Again, Pinto (2009) is an extended account of what makes
something a reason, and suggests (p. 291) that that, if we can deal with the threat of
an infinite regress of reasons, we might equate its being reasonable to adopt an
attitude A toward a propositional content with having a good reason all things
considered to adopt that attitude. Moreover, the paper suggests (in notes 26 and 27
on p. 290) how certain “internalist” moves suggested in Pollock (1995) and Pryor
(2005) might enable us to deal with the threat of infinite regress.
Secondly, Aiken suggests my view is “is ecumenical with the other theories of
argument”. He writes:
Given that argument may have a variety of goals and our evaluation of it may take
on the breadth of that variety, epistemic objectives with argument are the ones
Pinto holds are “most interesting,” but are nevertheless [just one] among other
objectives.

Aikin is quite correct that my view is “ecumenical” in this respect.
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